Cheaper attacks on leftover 1024-bit RSA
On Friday, November 6, at 12:20 PM ET, Google DeepMind reported that AI agents, guided by humans and working with cryptographers at UC San Diego and Inria, found two cheaper ways to attack obsolete 1024-bit RSA keys.
In a measured test, they re-ran a published signature-forgery attack in 391 CPU core-years, versus 1,380 in the original study, about 3.5 times less. A second method, still only estimated and not yet built, would make each additional 1024-bit key about 30 times cheaper to factor after a large upfront cost.
RSA-2048 and larger keys are not affected. The forgery does not recover the private key, and it needs about 4 billion signing queries made in advance. The practical step is still cheap and worth doing: retire any remaining 1024-bit DKIM, SSH, or TLS keys on servers and home gear.
Sources: DeepMind’s writeup on X, and SecurityWeek.